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Abstract
Background: Hospital usage and service demand during an Infectious Disease (ID) outbreak can tax the health
system in different ways. Herein we conceptualize hospital surge elements, and lessons learnt from such events,
to help build appropriately matched responses to future ID surge threats.
Methods: We used the Interpretive Descriptive qualitative approach. Interviews (n = 35) were conducted with governance
and public health specialists; hospital based staff; and General Practitioners. Key policy literature in tandem with the interview
data were used to iteratively generate a Hospital ID Surge framework. We anchored our narrative account within this
framework, which is used to structure our analysis.
Results: A spectrum of surge threats from combinations of capacity (for crowding) and capability (for treatment complexity)
demands were identified. Starting with the Pyramid scenario, or an influx of high screening rates flooding Emergency
Departments, alongside fewer and manageable admissions; the Reverse-Pyramid occurs when few cases are screened and
admitted but those that are, are complex; during a ‘Black’ scenario, the system is overburdened by both crowding and
complexity. The Singapore hospital system is highly adapted to crowding, functioning remarkably well at constant near-full
capacity in Peacetime and resilient to Endemic surges. We catalogue 26 strategies from lessons learnt relating to staffing,
space, supplies and systems, crystalizing institutional memory. The DECIDE model advocates linking these strategies to types
of surge threats and offers a step-by-step guide for coordinating outbreak planning and response.
Conclusions: Lack of a shared definition and decision making of surge threats had rendered the procedures somewhat
duplicative. This burden was paradoxically exacerbated by a health system that highly prizes planning and forward thinking,
but worked largely in silo until an ID crisis hit. Many such lessons can be put into play to further strengthen our current
hospital governance and adapted to more diverse settings.
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Background
Increase in trade and travel, as well as ecological and cli-
mate changes have made pockets of the world more vul-
nerable to health system surges caused by Infectious
Disease [1] (ID). Singapore is a financial hub and major
tourist, and transiting port of South-East Asia [2]. This
coupled with an ageing population, and space crunch in
Singapore’s major hospitals [3] makes ID Surge planning
a central policy issue.
Since the aftermath of SARS (2003), the first major
pandemic of 21st century, it is anticipated that many
countries still do not have adequate advance emergency
planning to deal with outbreaks, including threats of
H5N1, H1N1 influenza [4–8]. Some key challenges
include shortage of Protective Personal Equipment
(PPE), communication, and systems incident manage-
ment [4, 5, 8]. Systems bottlenecks are the largest
crosscutting issue for surge planning and response. For
example, according to a study of 29 disasters prior to 9/11
in USA, in only 6% of cases was there a supply shortage
and only 2% suffered manpower shortages [9]. The issue
therefore is often about getting the right resources to the
right places at the right time.
We have undertaken a qualitative study using the In-
terpretive Description (IntD) approach [10–12], based
on in-depth interviews with healthcare (e.g. clinicians,
public health specialists) and policy (Ministry of Health)
professionals in Singapore. This method seeks to narrate
health policy and service improvements through broad-
brush qualitative analyses, which relate experiences to
an interpreted framework, constructed from what is
known to be significant to the issue of interest. Given that
surge events can be meaningfully conceptualized [8, 13–15]
and are also bound to realities and shifting contexts, the
IntD theoretical underpinnings are well aligned to our
work. These underpinnings also allowed for the co-
construction of meaning between researchers and
participants.
Therefore, we aim to produce an evidenced-based set
of tools to improve incident management systems
informed by narrating accounts of ID outbreaks in
Singapore from 1999 onwards (since the Nipah out-
break) [16]. Our objectives are to:
(1)Identify the basic conceptual elements of hospital ID
surges, combining constructs from the literature
[13–15, 17] with those emergent in our data, and
situating analysis by describing the backdrop of ID
surge events featuring in our context;
(2)Describe a typology of ID hospital surge threat
scenarios primarily in relation to virulent air/droplet
borne diseases - contrasting with vector borne
scenarios - and link this to levels of alert for hospital
planning and response;
(3)Collate lessons learnt from past air/droplet borne ID
outbreaks and catalogue these into incident
management strategies related to: staffing, space,
supplies (or ‘stuff ’ sic) [15] and systems [14, 15].
Basic elements of hospital surge events were extracted
from literature captured in a systematic review on this
topic [14, 15]. These analyses were further verified
against key policy literature identified by scoping the
World Health Organisation (WHO) and Singapore Min-
istry of Health (MoH) websites.
Methods
We used a multiple stakeholder qualitative design (n = 35),
conducting interviews with largely tertiary and policy sector
health care professionals, as well as primary care physicians,
Table 1. We report study methods following the Consoli-
dated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative research (COREQ)
checklist [18]. Data were collected by a senior social
scientist and experienced qualitative researcher (ZH), and
trained female researchers (SS, JJ and QT), from clinical,
bio-sciences and public health backgrounds. ZH initially
lead the interviews, supported by the clinical team mem-
bers who later co-led them together or conducted them
independently.
The interviews were semi-structured with a narrative
component at the start, lasting up to an hour. The nar-
rative component asked interviewees to recount their
Table 1 Sample characteristics by professional cadre, n = 35
Main functions NO Years’ experience
(mean)
Standard Deviation from
the mean
Hospital based staff Clinicians (C) 8 16 8.59
Microbiologist (M) 3 17 8.49
Nurses (N) 7 11.6 9.38
Operations manager (OM) 3 30.33 3.30
Governance and public
health specialists
Board members (BM) 4 26.25 5.40
Public health practitioners (PHP) 5 15.4 9.41
Primary health care
physicians
General Practitioner (GPs) 5 32.2 11.50
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most memorable surge outbreak, these were hooked
onto a historical timeline of known outbreaks (1999,
Nipah virus; 2003, SARS; 2005, 2007 and 2013, Dengue;
2008, Chikungunya; 2009, H1N1-Swine flu; 2014 Ebola
preparations; 2015 MERS CoV preparations). These
included both air and droplet borne, and vector borne
diseases.
Related topics structuring the reminder of the inter-
view included: current state of resources; historical
opportunities for improvements; decision-making
processes. The topic guide was piloted and revisions in-
corporated, see Supplementary file for a copy of this
tool. Given we followed the Interpretive Descriptive the-
oretical approach, we prompted narrative with very open
questions to start but also helped to co-construct the
focus of the discussion, anchoring it towards the
elements of hospital surging known to be of interest.
Sampling was purposive, seeking maximum variation
of healthcare professionals with significant experience
managing ID surges; emphasis was on recruiting reputed
specialists in the ID field to start with. Most re-
structured hospital representatives gave permission for
their staff to be approached; Singapore General Hospital
(SGH) refused to participate. This included clinical staff
working in the Infectious disease, Emergency Medicine
and Microbiology department from regional institutions
(Changi General Hospital, CGH; Khoo Teck Puat Hos-
pital, KTPH; National University Hospital, NUH; Tan
Tock Seng Hospital, TTSH; Ministry of Health, MoH).
Participants comprised Public Health Specialists (n = 5),
Board Members (n = 4), Clinicians (n = 8), Nurses
(n = 7), Operations Managers (n = 3), and General Prac-
titioners (GPs; n = 5). TTSH is the major ID hospital in
Singapore, thus 53% of interviews were carried out with
participants based at this hospital.
With the help of our collaborators we reached out to a
core group of ID specialists in each of the restructured
hospitals that agreed to take part in the study by email.
Respondents were invited if they had experience working
in Singapore health system from 2003 onwards and had
ID expertise. Once we had the core group of ID special-
ists we asked them for recommendations at the end of
their interview, or snowballed [19] until the range of
participants were recruited, mostly via email invitation.
Snowballing was used to gain an entry point for hard-to-
reach, very busy professionals, who could not be emailed
as a ‘cold call’. Frontline healthcare workers were
approached directly at the shift end, with the introduc-
tion of senior clinicians or head nurses. General practi-
tioners (GPs) were recruited on ASEAN Dengue day
conference held in Singapore.
We stopped participant recruitment once saturation
from referrals was reached; 81% of invited interviewees
agreed to take part. Interviewees had been in the
Singapore healthcare system an average of 20 years. In-
terviews were conducted in institutional settings; prefer-
ably in more neutral meeting rooms, or otherwise in the
participants’ offices. The interviews started with defining
ID health services surges, which was very broadly stated
as a ‘sudden, anticipated or unanticipated escalation in
health service usage caused by an ID outbreak’. We also
asked participants to define ‘capacity’, and ‘capability’ in
the hospital setting. The fuller discussion was then
triggered by asking about the most memorable surge ex-
perience, and hooked onto a timeline of historic outbreaks.
The majority of the participants met the researchers
for the first time during the interview. All participants
consented to be audio-recorded for the interview on
condition of anonymity. Primary and frontline health-
care workers’ interviews tended to be shorter, lasting for
20–35 min for health care workers, whereas senior level
participant’s interviews were longer. Rapport was easily
established, although we did ask for permission to
follow-up with repeat interviews, this was not judged
necessary because of the richness of the data and open-
ness of interviewees during the first encounter; member
check of analyses and selected quotes was undertaken
prior to publication.
Prior to narrative analysis we familiarised ourselves
with data by reading and rereading the transcripts,
which were then sorted under a Hospital ID surge
Framework, which derives its known elements from the
key literature [13–17], as well as additional conceptual
categories emergent from qualitative coding and sorting
of data. JJ and SS organised the data, ZH and SS discussed
codes and confirmation of the frameworks components.
This included iterative comparisons against our interview
data, known elements, repositioning and finally confirm-
ing analyses. SS then coded the transcripts according to
our objectives for: 1) elaborations of surge events; 2) the
typology of surge threats; and 3) the emergent lessons
learnt. ZH refined and agreed these analyses.
We report results according to the IntD method using
a narrative reporting format [12]. This does not result in
a list of themes, but instead in accounts that respond
directly to the study objectives. We structure analysis
around the conceptual elements presented in Fig. 1 and
narrate each in turn, anchored in our data.
Results
Objective 1: Identifying the conceptual elements of ID
hospital surges
The Hospital ID Surge Framework (Fig. 1) has two core,
opposing yet complimentary elements: Capacity and
Capability. As one nurse summarised these: ‘So surge
[capacity] is a sudden increase in numbers in a short period
of time… [and capability] something like in your ability to
control [surge events] within your own limits.’ - N7.
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Capacity is broadly referred to in respect to crowding,
and as such is known as the quantitative arm of surge
management [13] and having enough of what is needed
such as beds, medicine and people to manage it [14, 15].
Capacity was readily understood by our participants as
such, for example: ‘So I suppose Surge is a statistical term
laah, so it refers to incident within a period of time.’ - C2.
Capability is broadly conceptualised by the complexity of
disease management. It is the qualitative sister to capacity.
It refers instead to the specialised ability needed to under-
stand a pathogen and offer related specialized care [15, 17].
Capability was anchored in competencies and necessarily
the ‘knowability’ of a pathogen, and quality and safety
procedures. These were notably based on institutional
memory: ‘So when you build these capabilities and you have
an institutional memory, then you are better able to react
and respond more intuitively to the next sets of uncertain-
ties. So, I think that is what we have in place.’ - BM3.
The Framework for ID hospital surge planning & re-
sponse, Fig. 1, anchors these two known core concepts
as well as the known structure of staff, space, supplies
and systems [14, 15]: the ‘four Ss’ (boxed in grey), to our
narrative analysis. We then present new concepts that
emerged beyond, across, and within these existing
known elements.
The Framework shows the concepts that emerged in-
ductively from the interviews (boxed in white). We
found the concept and understanding of a Hospital
Surge Event itself important. We therefore begin the nar-
ration of the framework by elaborating the nature of
Surge Events in our setting, as an extension of our first
Objective and to situate our findings. These events are
ultimately related to Typologies, described by Objective
2, which are represented by more or less emphasis on
capacity and capability; all of which lead squarely to
Coordination with respect to the ‘four Ss’. The bulk of
our new concepts largely include sub-components of the
‘four Ss’, which will be further elaborated under the
lessons learnt Objective 3.
Situating the analysis: Hospital surge events in
Singapore
The first outbreak on our timeline was the Nipah virus
in 1999. However, for this outbreak it emerged that its
impact wasn’t felt much due to the small number of
cases, non-complexity of treatment, and early contain-
ment [16]. The most memorable surge event experi-
enced by our participants was almost always SARS
(2003). SARS was the first ID outbreak that caught
people completely off guard, and became crystalized as
something that changed ID practices thereafter. The
slow-to-be-understood and complexity of the disease
was its most painful feature: ‘In the beginning SARS was
difficult. So… it evolved and then, you know, such that…
Fig. 1 Framework for ID hospital surge planning & response
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it’s so meticulous until you have to have goggles and eye-
wear and visors’ - PHP5.
Though SARS was unanimously named and discussed
as the most dramatic surge event, it was also, somewhat
paradoxically, characterised by an unusually ‘empty
hospital’. SARS served as a turning point in the ID surge
preparedness in Singapore and was said to have taught
many lessons, used to curtail other epidemics. For
example, one Clinician noted: ‘Essentially SARS shook us
in how we practice, the whole hospital, right from emer-
gency department all the way to the wards and the ICU.
So, we actually have a set of protocols, on how things are
to be done…so the concept was fresh from SARS’ - C1.
During the H1N1 (2009) outbreak an overwhelming
number of patients were described as crowding the
hospital Emergency Department (ED) during the earlier
containment phase. Because H1N1 wasn’t as complex a
disease as SARS, hardly any patient was admitted in
ICU. As one Nurse described it: ‘The difference in H1N1
was […] because. I remember that the peak period of
H1N1 we were screening about 600 cases every day. Yah,
so the surge was the challenge then… It was the turn-
around time for the screening results to be out. So that
took about between 6 to 12 hours. And imagine having a
few hundred people in front of you for 6 to 12 hours and
they getting fidgety and some of them were called from
airport and brought here, yah’ - N1.
Despite this extreme patient load, the H1N1 surge was
described in far less dramatic terms compared to SARS.
Some of the clinicians mentioned that the containment
policy for H1N1 initially was an overreaction and other
nations had a better response to surge by not initiating
mass screening policies. Correspondingly, Dengue (2005,
2007 and 2013) outbreaks were described as having the
lowest impact. Some GPs reported extra loads, but gen-
erally hospital staff said they system was able to cope
well, since this flow of patients tended to be expected
and not much over the norm, for instance: ‘Actually, I
didn't feel that much, you know, day in day out we just
work. Of course, there are a number of dengue patients
coming in… I don't feel stress because of the dengue pa-
tients’- N2.
The Chikungunya outbreak (2008) was described in
comparable terms, also a vector borne disease, for which
the transmission tended to be slower due to prevention
at source. These IDs were related by our respondents to
seasonal flu: which is easily transmittable in theory yet
in practice does not cause volumes of cases because of
early preventative measures, vaccines and self-contain-
ment. Plus, these IDs were described as easily man-
aged once diagnosed: ‘Dengue, you know, and because
of during the flu season when we have more cases of
pneumonia, respiratory diseases coming in. So that I
think we experience it regularly.’ - OM3. We observed
a system highly adapted to capacity threats.
Objective 2: Describing a typology of ID hospital surge
threat scenarios to link to alert levels for planning and
response
The types of functional vs. threat ID surge scenarios in
our context are summarised in Fig. 2. In our typology of
threat scenarios, it was the combination and extent to
which capacity and capability were experienced that
determined the surge threat intensity.
Peacetime scenario
Our participants talked about ‘Peacetime scenario’ (Fig. 2a)
which was described as a time where no ID outbreak was
occurring. Nevertheless, this the Singapore setting this was
experienced as a system that was already stretched for
capacity: ‘Hospital bed occupancy rates are usually in the
Fig. 2 Typology of hospital surge threats scenarios
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red zone, somewhere around 85-95% on a daily basis, so
very little capacity’- C7.
Endemic scenario
It was interesting that Endemic or seasonal scenarios
(Fig. 2b) like Dengue or flu were consistently, and by all
hospital based cadres, differentiated from what was
considered threatening surges: ‘Everyday fluctuations, or en-
demic diseases, we don’t actually consider it as a surge’ –
C3. Therefore, the Singapore system has become highly
resilient in terms of adapting to lack of space and crowding.
As long as hospital demand spikes were related to well--
known IDs and prevented from exploding at source, they
were viewed as manageable.
Pyramid crowding scenario
Threats were experienced when the ID need for screen-
ing spread beyond adapted, resilient capacity. The H1N1
outbreak was described thus. This outbreak takes the
shape of a Pyramid crowding scenario (Fig. 2c), shrink-
ing upward from a high screening volume to fewer and
fewer admissions: ‘The number of patients coming to the
hospital forms this space, alright [holds hands wide
apart]. The number of patients that really are at risk is
this big [shows a smaller space]. And then it goes up, it
goes up, and finally there at the top are the patients that
are infected [shows very small space]’ – BM4. The size of
the Pyramid tiers was seen to also inform the decision to
refer for screening in the first place, and contact tracing
policies, which can themselves be either overblown or
not stringent enough.
Reverse-pyramid scenario
Most mentions of capability came from narratives on
SARS, which can be described as a (Fig. 2d) Reverse-
Pyramid scenario. Here the issue was not ED crowding
but the complexity of managing the disease that was the
challenge, as one participant remarked: ‘It is not business
as usual. [although] In fact, during SARS, the hospital is
actually quite empty’ - BM4. Despite little crowding it
was this service surge demand that caused the most fear,
disruption, casualties and confusion in our setting.
Black scenario
Prophesized ‘Black’ scenarios (Fig. 2e) consisted of
crowding and high caseloads, combined with little ability
to manage their complexity, as described here: ‘What
happens if you exceed that [past predicted capacity and
capability], and I think that is Spanish Flu revisited type
of scenario, which is classically a Black scenario, which
everybody knows if it happens, you know, life ends as it
extends.’ - BM3. Spanish flu (1918) [20] was not con-
tained at source, nor easily treatable, so exploded into an
international pandemic.
Coordination
Hence coordination (Fig. 2d) emerged as a key concept,
based on the real fears that a lack of both capacity and
capability could lead to Black outcomes. Coordination
will vary according to which threat scenario is being ex-
perienced. Specifically, the threat level as determined by
the combination of crowding and complexity.
In the case of SARS quickly actioned contact tracing
curtailed transmission at source, as did a stringent con-
tainment response and hospital infection control, this
prevented the Black scenario in which both the front
end and back end of hospital services are overloaded
with complex cases. H1N1 could also have exploded into
a blacker scenario had the pathogen mutated or the dis-
ease somehow been harder to treat. In our settings
Dengue is very well managed at source but in other less
prepared setting outbreaks may escalate to pyramids
with high screening rates and also wider middle tiers,
making more admissions as the top tier.
Despite addressing very real fears, ID surge planning
was described as immensely burdensome: ‘The fear of
Ebola is a much bigger wave compared to the disease it-
self.’ - BM1. Much emphasis was placed on managing
cases before they get out of control - if capability is ef-
fective, capacity vulnerabilities can be reduced. Hence, a
lot of resources and efforts were very visibly exhausted
with this aim in mind, put simply: ‘You know then I
would say, you don’t need to do anymore here. There is
nowhere better prepared than here.’ - C5.
Therefore, being on alert was highly prized, yet little
coordination appeared to go into sharing this burden be-
tween hospitals, or clearly defining threats and related
needs and priorities within coordination practices. Expli-
cit points of reference to inform coordination also
appeared to be lacking. Participants from hospitals fol-
low detailed protocols such as – ‘Ebola was something
entirely different. So that’s why they have to come up
with err new protocols’ - N6 – which requires a lot of
effort to be tailored to each looming ID surge event.
Yet there is no alert system, providing definitions of
surge threats for hospitals, their staff and governors. An-
other senior participant described this gap thus: ‘if I fast
forward that to the current Ebola, now we have to basic-
ally deal, number one [first and foremost], with a very
considered view of what exactly is a threat [emphasis
our own]; so, when I was overseeing the initial Ebola
requirements for the hospitals, there were a lot of barriers
that were primarily driven by conventional [and impli-
citly inaccurate] definitions [of threats].’ - BM3.
The current alert system used in Singapore is called:
‘Disease Outbreak Response System Condition’ ‘DORS-
CON’ [21], which is initiated to help guide public con-
tainment, contact and to some extent screening
behaviours, based on the perceived danger of spread
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from the ID, within and beyond Singapore. This system
is based on a community and boarder control perspec-
tive, and is a useful in accounting for transmission
modes beyond hospital settings.
Objective 3
Mapping lessons learnt to surge threats to improve
coordination.
The lessons learnt are anchored onto the recognised
incident management domains. In this set of analyses,
we elaborate the sub-categories for each of these areas,
as listed in Fig. 1:
 Staffing: Manpower management and willingness to
work;
 Space: Institutional roles and national level policy;
 Supplies: Equipment and stockpiling;
 Systems: Financing for innovation, communication,
monitoring and surveillance, as well as logistics and
operations.
In Fig. 3 we catalogue corresponding strategies from
lessons learnt relating to each of these categories and
sub-categories. Strategies are indicated as S1 to S26; we
narrate them below according to the IntD approach in
relation to our threat scenarios and capacity vs. capability
challenges.
Staffing
Staffing is a challenge during any surge threat, since both
sufficient and adequately trained staffs need to be mobi-
lised. After SARS, ID physicians in Singapore tripled in
numbers [15] but still it was feared that in the event of
another potential Black scenario there may be shortfall.
Manpower management during an outbreak requires an
increase in the staff/patient ratio. The first strategy
noted by our participants was (S1) planning for an in-
crease in nursing staff in particular – a reserve buffer of
30% was considered ideal by operations managers, to
relieve pressure during Pyramid or Black threat scenar-
ios: ‘So because I think it depends on what type of out-
break and therefore what kind of deployment you need la
basically. But all I can say is that so far, besides the
SARS […] we are not needed any additional medical
manpower. It is only the nursing manpower… So, we just
have to supplement whatever we need if there is any
infectious disease outbreak basically’ - OM3.
On the other hand, (S2) specialist clinical staff were
see as needing redeploying the advent of a Reverse-
Pyramid or Black scenario. Senior participants men-
tioned that during ID outbreaks they can seek to recruit
staff from other hospitals, less specialized in ID hospitals
or redeploy nurses within the same hospital to supple-
ment a Pyramid load. But this came with problems,
Fig. 3 Mapping lessons learnt to surge threat scenarios
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given that it took some time to settle in staff into a new
environment and/or role and for them to become effi-
cient. Thus, (S3) drilling all existing staff in Infection
Control policies before bringing in extra support was
seen as important; this included setting up leadership
roles and accountable training leads to coach new
recruits effectively was one way to improve capability.
Similarly, thinking ahead about recruitment during
peacetime was important. For example, it was suggested
that (S4) CVs of short-listed clinical, nursing and lab ap-
plicants should be kept after recruitment drives, with
permission, so that these candidates can be called on
during surge events. There was discussion of using
volunteers: ‘We did have a meeting and many people
volunteered, PhD people volunteered…but we decided not
to go with that and just employ our own people and use
our own people.’ - M1. But the consensus was that the
people with the right CVs for the post were needed, and
it was better to build up a contacts list for these, or re-
deploy within, than stretch people’s capability.
The other facet of staffing is related to the social and
psychological support strategies motivating willingness
to work, and to work well, of healthcare professionals
during these turbulent times. Related strategies are par-
ticularly important when facing virulent and deadly
pathogens such as SARS or Ebola. Good leadership, (S5)
motivating by example, was perceived to the most
important factor keeping staff turning up and doing
their best. During SARS the leaders volunteered to do
the risky procedures and praised their staff to the media
[15]. (S6) Transparent and honest feedback systems were
seen to improve both work attendance rates and work-
flows and were described as one of the best ways of
retaining the confidence from staff; this will be further
elaborated communication section below.
(S7) Staff greatly valued the provision of adequate Per-
sonal Protective Equipment (PPE) and clear, repeat
training and routines to protect themselves. During
SARS for instance temperature of all working staff were
taken at regular intervals. Ebola drills were deemed re-
assuring. Besides these practical considerations, a major
theme in our participants’ narratives revolved around
the cultural idea of hospital ‘kampong’ or village society,
a notion retained from an earlier period in Singapore
culture. This was described as a feeling of belongingness,
‘we are in this together’ spirit that helped in combating
the fears of the staff. As one participant explained: ‘you
have a common goal, you have a common enemy, and
between nurses, doctors, allied health admin… So many
of us reflect this and find that it was a time rekindle our
kampong spirit.’- BM2. Offering staff morale boosting
food and in some hospitals quarantine housing nearby
was seen to go a someway to help (S8) maintain this
caring and close-knit culture.
Still, the biggest demoralizing factor for staff were de-
scribed as fears of infecting their families; particularly
their children. Relatedly, one of the strategies for optimal
infection control policy during SARS was to maintain
what became referred to as ‘dirty – clean’ teams, the
‘dirty’ ones being the ones serving the infected patients
and clean was serving non-SARS patients. Feeling of
ostracism and not wanting to come in contact with
family anyway caused a lot of additional stress: ‘We
actually stayed at home—is that the best? What about
my family?’- C3. Such overt segregation can also lead
to higher infection rates, due to lax PPM of the
‘clean’ teams.
(S9) Minimizing ostracism and streamlining practices
of ‘dirty’ vs. ‘clean’ teams emerged as essential. During a
comparatively empty hospital anyhow we propose that it
is feasible for all staff to be encouraged to uptake routin-
ized basic PPM, thus emphasising that anyone may have
‘dirty’ exposure. More stringent measures should, of
course, be used for those workers in close contact with
infected patients, as well as comfortable longer-stay
accommodation giving colleagues the option to be
matched with someone they know. Deliberate rewording
of ‘close contact’ teams and ‘less exposed’ teams should
be emphatically used.
Space
Space, a classic capacity issue, was unanimously charac-
terised by reference to a system that was built to cater to
chronic diseases, and nowadays emphasising solutions
for an ageing population, in which ID has not been a
priority. It is very difficult to create ID space in already
congested hospitals: ‘I think because [in] Singapore, you
know, infectious diseases is not our number one disease
burden, so a lot of way our infrastructure is structured
might not actually cater for that [ID outbreak].’ - OM3.
Space has always been an issue in ID surge events where
isolation measures pose an additional burden on the
existing space crunch. Currently in Singapore there are
few isolation rooms in the hospitals built before SARS
and hence patients already exposed to each other
(family) were cohorted in the same isolation room by
partition. It was explained that it is part of the Institu-
tional role to back the initiatives that (S10) counter this
outdated historical legacy.
One solution has been to plan a new ID Centre, the
National Centre for Infectious Disease (NCID), planned
to be in operation by 2018 [22]. This building will be
able to admit between 200 and 300 patients during an
ID surge event. It has been suggested that paradoxically
one ‘cannot plan…you cannot build a white elephant’,
just on the off chance of it being needed. It has also been
acknowledged that maybe it is not really needed, since
alongside an ID surge there is a reduction in electives
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that free up bed capacity, also: ‘Of course if it is a ID
surge, the general public will avoid us. So, then there will
possibly be more room to reallocate our spaces and all
that’ - C5. Nevertheless, (S11) facing the ‘white elephant’
appeared to be underway, and staggered to make it
manageable.
For example, senior administrators and clinicians
discussed lobbying for more single occupancy isolation
rooms, Microbiologists for enough space for their large
equipment to process screening, and state-of-the-art
equipment. In the meantime, the system has adapted by
using temporary structures, such as setting up laborator-
ies in general Intensive Care Unit (ICU) rooms (Ebola
preparations). Alternate Treatment Sites (ATS) were
built by hospitals as an emergency tented areas during
H1N1. Such spaces are necessary to planning in a space
constrained setting. National policy level initiatives to
(S12) improve these set-ups include scouting better loca-
tions, as well as structures with capacity for greater
distancing of patients, temporary ventilation systems and
basic amenities.
Another solution to minimize congestion is to (S13)
restructure insurance plans and primary care capacity to
address overuse of hospitals for ID, instead moving
screening and basic treatments to primary care clinics.
In the long run this will create more hospital capacity
without having to build it. It is a phenomenon particular
to Singapore Health insurance Medisave policy [23], that
it encourages the over-utilisation of hospitals because
hospital bills are paid by insurance, whereas GPs and
polyclinics visits are largely paid out of pocket as such:
‘Because if you get admitted, you goes under Medisave,
you know so if you get a full blood count every day, cost
30 dollars a day, and you know you get your….whatever,
40 bucks a day, times five days you know pay by
Medisave. But if you went to a GP, charged you 40 bucks
a day, you will pay out of your pocket’ - PH01.
Another national level policy concern relates to much
toing and froing on whether to have a designated
hospital to house all patients during a nationwide out-
break or whether each hospital ‘keeps’ its own patients
without referring them onwards. This question is not
easy to address. During SARS one hospital - Tan Tock
Seng Hospital (TTSH) - was designated. From a capabil-
ity perspective, it appears more efficient to centre the
bulk of resources in one place; yet we were reminded by
our participants that this comes with risks (contagion
during transportation and transfer), and requires plan-
ning of transport and investment in logistics. It is never-
theless underway (S14) that a state-of-the-art ID hospital
is being built. Largely, it appears, to be able to deal with
a Reverse-Pyramid hospital surge scenario. This new
facility should particularly cater adequate isolation
wards, unlike wards during SARS: ‘So from a ward that
is 30-35 bedder, suddenly you are dealing with ward with
seven beds. Because there were only seven cubicles [and
only one bed can be occupied in it at a time] and same
number of staff.’- BM2.
It was notable however that: ‘Making an acute hospital
another pandemic hospital was not a viable idea... be-
cause as you know by now most of Singapore’s hospitals
function at close to maximum capacity… And shutting
down a hospital has tremendous inextricable impacts on
the healthcare system’ - C4. A huge Pyramid or Black
scenario surge would require reserve (S15) ‘sister’ hospitals
and centres to manage overspill. Some participants men-
tioned that collaboration with private hospitals could be
helpful, and something that was not yet leveraged. Under-
utilized primary care centres and smaller public sister
tertiary centres can be set up to function as a centralised
hub during a mass outbreak. During H1N1 overspills were
naturally managed with sister-like facilities, adopted oppor-
tunistically as the need arose.
It was felt that the selection of appropriately regionally
distributed centres and coordination of planning and
response during Peacetime would minimise disruption
to on-going services during an outbreak. Nevertheless,
there are known drawbacks with using a designated ID
hospital, not least its likelihood to become stigmatised
for use during peacetime, the potential shutdown of
multiple large hospitals was not viable. It was however
notable to us that the biggest drain on the system
appeared to be the lack of confirmed decision on this
policy - which resulted in stockpiling and planning for a
‘what if we have to cope with this alone’ scenarios, which
can be seen as siloed, duplicative and ultimately wasteful
strategies.
Supplies
As for supplies, we were told about improvements in ID
surge preparedness Equipment and stockpiling since
SARS, during which a shortage of everyday supplies for
patient management (X-ray films, PPEs, etc.) was felt.
When H1N1 pandemic hit, the access to resources were
described as ready and available. Current policy in many
hospitals was to (S16) independently stock PPE’s, drugs
for at least 3 days, in order to allow time to reorder in
case of a surge event. In addition, (S17) transparent list-
ing of reserve supplies on a centralized system is import-
ant for coordinated planning. For example, to know
availability of surplus medical supplies and planning for
ID outbreak equipment will help operations managers
assess shortfalls, particularly if they are designated a
sister centre during a mass Pyramid or potentially Black
outbreak. (S18) Operations managers spoke of valuing
good relations with international suppliers.
Certain hospitals have also reported Financing for
innovation, in particular (S19) investing in automated
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devices to facilitate the monitoring of patients for clin-
ical management: ‘In terms of equipment we know that it
will be much better with using more automated devices,
instead of manually measuring’- BM2. Regarding sys-
tems investments, paradoxically, OMs tended to feel
their budgets were realistic, even generous: ‘I am glad to
say, and this can go on record, that MoH is very generous
with the budget and especially when it comes to an out-
break.’ – OM1. Whereas medics expressed reservations
along the lines (S20) that there was too much emphasis
on frugality, or basic care delivery, above innovation and
effectiveness: ‘The tagline is Singapore healthcare, the
most cost effective. [but] The emphasis is on cost [em-
phasis their own] effective. Not effectiveness. So it is bang
for buck’ - M3. Placing effectiveness above short term
cost-saving would improve capability in the face of any
surge threat.
Systems
Systems were built on generally sound communication,
emphatic consideration of logistics and operations and
some efforts toward monitoring and surveillance. With
respect to Communication it was relayed that Singapore
higher management (S21) valued principles of transpar-
ency. During SARS ‘The management was actually bru-
tally honest’- C1 [on SARS]. One poignant example was
shared during H1N1, when the only available Tamiflu
was recorded as past ‘best date’. Rather than try and
cover this up the management checked the efficacy of
the drug and was upfront about the issue: ‘basically we
went on TV say you know this stuff is perfectly good,
we’ve seen the test, someone saying ‘I would take it and
give it to my kids’.’PH1. This open dialogue with the
public built trust as well as transparency into the system.
In contrast, within institutional structure the flow of
communication has been very top-down with members
assigned an authoritative person to take instructions
from. It was noted that the system might benefit from
(S22) a flatter and wider structure. It was shared that
with fast moving issues on the ground, top-down in-
structions may not be applicable; some system to feed
how to adapt upwards was required. Immediate notifica-
tion was issued to senior staff, especially to doctors via
email. Nurses didn’t have any institutional email were
communicated only by roll calls at the start of each of
the three shifts in a day. One way to improve this was
suggested via SMS notification that could send alert and
procedural notifications direct to mobile phones.
A response inbox could be set up for staff to upload
notifications of difficulties on the ground, addressing the
general malaise that the decision makers: ‘[MoH] are in
an ivory tower… the layer between them is the hospital
administrators, of course…’-C6. As for boarding of com-
munication channels - it was noted that professionals
were quick to come together in a crisis - but it was em-
phasized that inter-agency communication needs to also
happen in Peacetime, and share information. Relatedly,
Monitoring and surveillance would also be helped by
(S23) recording bottom up bottlenecks, preferably in real
time. Surveillance in Singapore as an island nation has
otherwise been actioned toward uniformity, through
liaison with ministries. During major outbreaks Singapore
is notable as one of the few countries to issue daily sur-
veillance report against the standard one-week reports in
other pandemic affected countries.
Yet (S24) apart from prevalence data, other more
meaningful datasets and collaborative efforts to inform
future outbreak modelling appeared scarce and reluctant
to surface. Participants also mentioned the hierarchical
nature of system as a deterrent in vocalizing their
thoughts and working together in research areas. There
were also (S25) concerns regarding the detection of an
unusual cases or outbreak as there has been no formal
system set up to do this, or generalizable tools to guide
what to do in response; each outbreak was seen to re-
quire its own disease-specific protocol, intuitively and
implicitly using lessons learnt – this highlights the need
for the DECIDE tool proposed herein (see discussion
section and Fig. 4). We were told that as a rule of thumb
an incident of more than five cases of a particular dis-
ease, made it notifiable, but this not a formal guideline.
Although much emphasis was based on notifiability, the
real issue with using these data during an ID outbreak
was to help detect the threat, predict and plan logistics.
Logistics & operations were underscored as such: ‘In
terms of [the surges] stress on the system, [it impacts] not
in a emotional, or clinical, or structural [sense], or even…
in terms of science, as much as on the logistics’ - BM3.
But logistics for what? Without a reference point and
with changing guidelines logistics and their operations
are simply dress rehearsals for ‘what if ’ scenarios that
never to materialise. Here it became apparent that map-
ping the threats and how people can share resources to
address them was central to optimising logistics. Every
hospital has an emergency-planning department that
stays alert and issues protocol during surges, which is
then managed across departments to make HCWs re-
spond in a coordinated manner. These systems need to
be harnessed as efficiently as possible. Infection Control
(IC) and to a lesser extent complex disease management
were at the centre of these systems.
Such planning tended to boil down to capacity or
(S26) ‘upsizing’ to address IC by increasing staff ratios
because of lengthy, time consuming, strict infection
control practices; or to deal with travellers brought for
screening and isolation at the hospitals straight from air-
port; added paperwork, liaison with the embassies. But
there were also the months of capability assurance and
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training. Learning about equipment and treatment
protocols, running PPE usage drills, practicing patient
transport routes. Transferring of suspected and probable
cases across hospitals remains a major area of concern.
Contact tracing of taxi drivers and passengers once
SARS was known may well have saved Singapore from a
Black scenario. Standardizing these processes, including
mortuary procedures and sewage cleaning, and limiting
a bulk of resources to designated and sister hospitals can
save procedural waste.
Decision-making
Regards decision-making we noted that leaders of
Singapore are very principle driven; and expect policies
to be based on fundamentals of science; but science in
context, relying on institutional memories, as one opera-
tions manager put it: ‘You know in Singapore, we work
things out from first principles, we will already have
some certain level of knowledge as to what will work and
what will not work.’- OM2. The efficacy of ministries
was respected. Targeted involvement from health profes-
sionals in the formulation of policies during surges was
also seen to be an important exercise. The worry was
also the institutional memories were getting lost: ‘And I
think immediately after SARS, the awareness was there
for everyone but there been turnover and everything. So,
people have actually, you know, kind of like forgotten you
know, so that is one thing’ - OM3.
As such we propose to formalise institutional memor-
ies, using them systematically toward better decision-
making. Systems function rests ultimately on good
coordination, which is not an exact science, takes
account of logistical realities while using institutional
memory. This is but likened to an engineering challenge:
‘I am putting it to you that a surge response is an engin-
eering challenge. It is not a science challenge. It is not an
admin challenge. It is not a microbiology or lab
challenge. It is an engineering challenge.’ –M2. Like all
engineering challenges the apt response depends on the
soundness and extent of understanding of the problem,
finding a mapped solution, communicating and sharing
it accurately and adapting it when needed.
Discussion
Using DECIDE steps
To preserve, advance institutional memories, and ensure
new ones are captured we propose the DECIDE steps.
The six steps in DECIDE, are detailed in Fig. 4, and are
summarised as: Detecting, and linking to surge threat
scenarios, as defined in Fig. 2; Evolving, by linking your
threat to strategies, Fig. 3; Communicating your ap-
proach to your various stakeholders; Implementation
planning through an appropriately representative
committee (in terms of staff, space, supplies and systems);
Delivering your intervention by adapting it to unexpected
bottlenecks; and again – since nothing ever fully goes to
plan - Evaluating it, by recording new lessons learnt and
updating your list of strategies as you go.
Some institutional memories will be instantly clear
and can be brought to immediate systems benefit.
Fig. 4 DECIDE steps to coordinate planning and response for hospital ID surges
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Others, may require time - professional, disciplinary and
cultural distancing to come into focus. It is these mem-
ories and experiences, which this research sought to
record. One such notable conclusion is that the existing
constraints on the Singapore hospital systems, operating
at maximum capacity itself appears to have rendered it
buoyant to shocks, rather than more vulnerable to them.
People, departments, agencies have had to learn to adapt
every day to never lessening demands. This itself seems
to have rendered the system better able to absorb and
bounce back from shocks. Shocks such as H1N1 could
have utterly collapsed a health system with existing
space crunches.
Main findings
It was a surprising finding that Dengue or other endemic
and seasonal surges were absorbed by a system so close
to the brink, in such a normalised fashion. It is neverthe-
less both paradoxical yet somehow evident that a system
which is so clearly burdened at the outset in terms of
capability is able to respond so well to it in a time of cri-
sis. Capacity is a systems’ issue that Singapore is con-
quering; perhaps issues such as space and manpower
influxes are simply easier to solve in the interim than
capability related ones. These, in turn, are evidenced to
be enabled by flatter, more explicit structures and lever-
aging of more integrated services and ways of working.
Conceptualization of ID hospital surges will help
toward better, practical, pre-emption of problem areas
[14, 15]. It has been demonstrated that Past ID surge
events responses were compromised due to lack of
coordination between hospitals leading to underutilization
of resources [5–9, 14, 15]. Singapore has taken consider-
able steps towards creating adequate preparedness for an
ID outbreaks and related hospital surges, like hiring add-
itional ID staff and training them in infection control ac-
tivities [16]. It has also planned having a buffer in
additional staff [24] and redeploying staff trained in infec-
tion control in the same institution, which has been
demonstrated to be better than relying on volunteers in
earlier studies [8, 14]. Staff using their tacit knowledge,
working flexibly and responsibly rather than being
overstretched; plus, sticking to incident management
protocols has been shown to be optimal in management
of ID surge events [25].
Hospitals and social institutes serve as amplifiers of ID
spread [13]; during SARS and MERS incidents of spread-
ing infections to healthcare workers were at their high-
est. Previous studies show that provision of adequate
PPEs, infection control training helped the staff feel
confident enough to stay put [26, 27] in any ID outbreak
despite the fact that they knew the high risk of contract-
ing infection. These measures combined with transpar-
ent communication and showing genuine concern for
the welfare of their staff helped in building trust and
confidence in their institution [26–29]. Still, the majority
fear infecting their family, and themselves, and being
ostracized. Segregation of ‘dirty’ vs. ‘clean’ teams has
been shown to fail in terms of IC, where the teams least
exposed were ultimately most likely to get infected [30].
Complete shutdown of mainstream hospitals, as was
the case during SARS in our setting and others, has
shown difficulty in recovering [31] and to remain
stigmatized by ID associations. Transportation of sus-
pected cases from one hospital to another is another big
area of concern. Ambulatory personnel can be infected
while transferring patients from one hospital to other
[30]. There were divided opinions on the usefulness of a
single centre taking charge of ID surge. Yet to have a
designated ID hospital equipped with the right capability
and improving the capability of chosen ‘sister’ institu-
tions will save total shutdowns and duplications of
planning measures. Singapore has planned a centre
solely for ID [22], this coupled with creation of appropri-
ately selected and provisioned alternate treatment sites,
and cutting down of electives [32] keeps the system
working a as whole. Peripheral hospitals tend to have
fewer ID staff, nor funding to establish high capability in
handling IDs [4, 5, 33, 34].
Developing a robust technology in preventing infec-
tion control mishaps and e-health helping in detecting
patterns will help deal better with nosocomial infections
and intervening early [35, 36] This approach was re-
cently highlighted by the Minister of State for Health
Chee Hong Tat who announced plans to make better
use of IT systems and data analytics to help them make
better decision [37]. And ways of using these in a shared
and transparent manner needs to be agreed. The need
for better inter-agency coordination, using institutional
memory and in particular closing the gap between
administrators and clinical staff voices, is a common
finding across setting [5, 6, 38]. The said ‘over-reaction’
to H1N1 – mass screening policy – which clinical staff
noted to be based on an overly cautionary reading of the
diseases threat is one example of this.
Strengths and limitations
Our Framework for ID hospital surge planning & re-
sponse builds on known elements and supplements this
existing work with primary, targeted, qualitative analysis.
Although many evaluations of surge management will
have documented disparate strategies, in specific
contexts, to our knowledge the conceptually mapping,
making use of historical data and institutional memory
has not yet been undertaken.
While all the 26 strategies that we identified as useful
in the Singapore context may not be generalizable to all
countries, the conceptual elements grouping them and
Singh et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:622 Page 12 of 14
identified typology threat scenarios are adaptable to dif-
ferent settings. We contend that the steps in the DECIDE
model are transferable and offer a useful process to map
hospital ID surge planning and response in any context.
We were limited by recruitment largely in one main
hospital (TTSH), because this is the hub of ID specialism
in Singapore, although remaining structures in Singapore
comprised nearly half of our interviewees. Singapore
General Hospital (SGH) refused to participate.
Conclusions
In sum, the current analyses are intended to help us
learn about the specific to inform the general. Our
Peacetime scenarios (inclusive of manageable endemic
outbreaks), Pyramid, Reverse Pyramid, and Black scenar-
ios will be catalysed by different IDs in different settings.
For example, in settings that cannot prevent vector
outbreaks at source so well, endemic outbreaks - e.g.
Malaria during the rainy seasons - may not be manage-
able, and will instead be typified as a pyramid scenario.
Likely with more admissions than was the case with
H1N1 in our setting due to higher transmissibility, thus
a wider middle tier and admissions peak. And not all
Peacetime settings will be predisposed to capacity limita-
tions from the start. The current study fills in the shapes
of what is ‘known’ to help plan for ‘unknowns’ [39]
during ID outbreaks.
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